Authentication and Hearsay: Which Trumps? by Saltzburg, Stephen A.
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works Faculty Scholarship 
2015 
Authentication and Hearsay: Which Trumps? 
Stephen A. Saltzburg 
George Washington University Law School, ssaltz@law.gwu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Saltzburg, Stephen A., Authentication and Hearsay: Which Trumps? (2015). 30 Crim. Just. (2015). ; GWU 
Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 2015-29; GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2015-29. 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2641141 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works by an authorized administrator of 
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact spagel@law.gwu.edu. 
5 2  C R I M I N A L  J U S T I C E  n  S p r i n g  2 0 1 5
Trial TacTics
Authentication and 
Hearsay: Which Trumps?
BY sTEPHEN a. salTZBUrG
sTEPHEN a. salTZBUrG is the Wallace 
and Beverley Woodbury University Professor 
at George Washington University School of 
Law in Washington, D.C. He is a past chair 
of the Criminal Justice Section and a regular 
columnist for Criminal Justice magazine. He 
is also author of the book Trial Tactics, Third Edition (American 
Bar Association 2013), an updated and expanded compilation 
of his columns.
Suppose that a document is offered by the gov-ernment as a defendant’s statement to prove the truth of its contents, and the defendant objects 
that he or she did not write or adopt the statement. To 
decide admissibility, does the trial judge use Federal 
Rule of Evidence 104(a) or 104(b)? Or does the judge 
use both? The answer should be clear after 40 years 
of experience with the evidence rules, but it remains 
cloudy for many courts and lawyers.
The Difference
Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) sets forth this standard:
(a) In General. The court must decide any
preliminary question about whether a witness is
qualified, a privilege exists, or evidence is admis-
sible. In so deciding, the court is not bound by
evidence rules, except those on privilege.
It makes clear that the judge may rely on inadmis-
sible evidence such as hearsay that would be excluded 
under Rule 802 in making a ruling.
Rule 104(b), on the other hand, sets forth a differ-
ent standard:
(b) Relevance that Depends on a Fact. When
the relevance of evidence depends on whether a
fact exists, proof must be introduced sufficient
to support a finding that the fact does exist. The
court may admit the proposed evidence on the
condition that the proof be introduced later.
On its face, Rule 104(b) makes clear that it oper-
ates similarly to Rule 901(a), which states that “[t]o 
satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identify-
ing an item of evidence, the proponent must produce 
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item 
is what the proponent claims it is.”
So, Rule 104(a) permits a judge to consider inad-
missible evidence in making an evidence ruling while 
Rules 104(b) and 901(a) require the judge to focus on 
evidence that actually is admitted. In the discussion 
that follows, each mention of Rule 104(b) should be 
assumed to also apply to Rule 901(a).
a sample case
United States v. Harvey, 117 F.3d 1044 (7th Cir. 1997), 
illustrates the conflict that may arise when a defendant 
objects that a statement is not his or hers. The defen-
dant, Roderick Harvey, set up a campsite for himself 
and his dog, Drigo, in the Shawnee National Forest, 
which is located in southern Illinois. He was charged 
with cultivating several plots of marijuana that law 
enforcement officials discovered near the campsite.
When law enforcement officials first discovered the 
marijuana plots during aerial surveillance, Harvey was 
in a hospital and rehabilitation center recovering from 
serious injuries suffered when he collided with a truck 
while riding a bicycle. He was in the center for approx-
imately six weeks after the marijuana was discovered, 
and from the outset he expressed concern about his 
dog being left somewhere in Shawnee National Forest.
It took law enforcement officials two weeks after 
spying the marijuana plots from the air to actually 
reach them on foot in an isolated, rugged location. They 
came upon some plants that were six to seven feet tall 
and were near a well-developed campsite containing 
two tents. The officers saw no people at or around the 
campsite but encountered a large, emaciated German 
shepherd that growled and barked at them.
The officers returned to the campsite a couple of 
days after first reaching it and installed vibration-
activated video surveillance equipment that they 
periodically checked for more than a month without 
finding any evidence of a human presence at the site.
Two days after Harvey left the center, officers con-
ducting live surveillance of the campsite saw him at 
the site moving around with the aid of crutches. The 
officers arrested Harvey, searched the campsite, and 
found freshly-cut marijuana and a black satchel near 
where Harvey had been sleeping in one of the tents.
Two notebooks found inside the satchel contained 
diary-like entries and things-to-do lists. There were 
references to planting dates, planting conditions, and 
the grow plots around the campsite. One crossed-out 
entry stated “20 plants into ground up top today.” 
Officers also found another entry that referred to the 
National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana 
Laws (NORML), numerous entries mentioning a dog 
named Drigo, miscellaneous papers bearing Harvey’s 
name, and a copy of a magazine generally devoted 
to the cultivation of marijuana. Officers testified that 
Harvey asked about his dog “Drago” (the name as 
recalled by one of the arresting officers) and the sta-
tus of his camping gear while being transported to 
federal court.
Harvey objected at trial to the admission of the diary 
entries, but the trial judge admitted them over objection 
despite the fact that the government did not offer any 
handwriting evidence at trial. On appeal, the govern-
ment argued that the entries were admissible because 
only the individual who planted the marijuana could 
have made them. The court of appeals found this argu-
ment to be unpersuasive:
The Government’s overall objective in this case 
was to prove that Harvey was responsible for the 
marijuana plants around the campsite. To prove 
that, the Government offered the written materials 
found there. But to authenticate those materials 
as Harvey’s writing, the Government argues that 
only Harvey could have written them because 
only the planter of the marijuana would keep 
those kinds of records. The Government, in other 
words, assumes that Harvey planted the mari-
juana—the very point it must ultimately prove. 
This is circular reasoning at its worst. The refer-
ences to the marijuana plants suggest the materials 
were written by the planter of the marijuana, but 
those references hardly imply that Harvey is the 
author/planter.
(Id. at 1049.)
The court nonetheless found no abuse of discretion 
on the part of the trial judge and explained as follows:
Rule 901(b)(4) allows evidence to be authen-
ticated by “[a]ppearance, contents, substance, 
internal patterns, or other distinctive character-
istics, taken in conjunction with circumstances.” 
The written materials were found in an isolated 
and remote area where law enforcement agents 
observed no one other than Harvey. The materi-
als were within Harvey’s campsite; indeed, they 
were next to Harvey’s own bed. The writings also 
make numerous references to Harvey’s beloved 
dog, Drigo. These distinctive characteristics and 
circumstances are sufficient to support a finding 
that the materials were written by Harvey.
(Id. (alteration in original).)
The court of appeals then turned to the question of 
what standard a trial judge must use in deciding on 
admissibility:
If the notes and diaries were truly written by Har-
vey, they would also not be hearsay because they 
would be statements made by a party-opponent. 
See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A). The question for 
us, however, is whether the finding of authen-
ticity under Rule 901 is sufficient to make the 
written materials nonhearsay under Rule 801. 
Some cases seem to treat the inquiries under the 
two rules as identical, meaning that authenticated 
statements by a party-opponent are automatically 
not hearsay. Indeed, the admissibility of hear-
say is routinely treated as a preliminary question 
under Rule 104(b) which, like Rule 901, requires 
only “evidence sufficient to support a finding.”
On the other hand, Bourjaily v. United States, 483 
U.S. 171, 107 S. Ct. 2775, 97 L. Ed. 2d 144 (1987), 
states that the Federal Rules of Evidence “nowhere 
define the standard of proof the court must observe 
in resolving these [preliminary] questions.” The 
Bourjaily Court therefore held that preliminary 
facts relevant to Rule 801(d)(2)(E)—the cocon-
spirator exception to the hearsay rule—must be 
proven under a “preponderance of the evidence” 
standard. Since Bourjaily, we have stated more 
generally that “[w]hen making preliminary factual 
inquiries about the admissibility of evidence under 
a hearsay exception, the district court must base its 
findings on the preponderance of the evidence.” 
United States v. Franco, 874 F.2d 1136, 1139 (7th 
Cir. 1989). The admission of evidence under Rule 
801 may therefore require a higher standard of 
proof than the prima facie showing required to 
authenticate evidence under Rule 901.
(Id. at 1049–50 (alterations in original) (citations 
omitted).)
In the end, the court of appeals failed to decide 
which rule governed and instead concluded that 
“[r]egardless of whether the authentication and hear-
say thresholds are identical, we find that the written 
materials satisfy the higher preponderance of the evi-
dence standard.” (Id. at 1050.) It appears that other 
courts believe that it is sufficient for the judge to find 
simply that Rule 104(b) is satisfied and that it is not 
to satisfy the higher standard of Rule 104(a). One 
example is United States v. Gil, 58 F.3d 1414 (9th Cir. 
1995). In still other cases, courts address the evidence 
question as simply a hearsay question without focus-
ing on authentication. One example is United States 
v. Brinson, 772 F.3d 1314 (10th Cir. 2014).
Getting to the right answer
So the question is which standard applies. The right answer 
is that the trial judge must use both Rule 104(b) and Rule 
104(a). A simple example can help to explain this.
Assume (1) the government charges a defendant 
with operating a website that is used to transmit child 
pornography and that there are pictures and statements 
on the website, (2) the government wants to admit the 
pictures, (3) the government wants to admit the state-
ments for their truth, and (4) the defendant objects on 
hearsay and authentication grounds.
Assume also that the trial judge has a hearing at which 
the government calls a law enforcement officer to testify 
that “I spoke with three longtime friends of the defen-
dant, who told me that the defendant told each of them 
that the website was his.” If the trial judge believes the 
officer, the judge could find by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the website was operated by the defendant, 
even though the officer’s testimony is inadmissible hear-
say. Rule 104(a) allows this. If the trial judge makes the 
preponderance finding, this would be sufficient for the 
judge to find that Rule 801(d)(2)(A) is satisfied as to the 
statements. But nothing in Rule 104(a) allows the judge 
to admit the officer’s testimony regarding what the three 
friends said, and it is highly unlikely that their statements 
would satisfy any hearsay exception. Therefore, there 
would be no admitted evidence to tie the defendant to 
the website, the government could not authenticate the 
photos as being posted by the defendant, and, there-
fore, the judge could not admit the photos into evidence 
because Rule 104(b) requires admissible evidence con-
necting the photos to the defendant.
Can it really be that the statements could be admitted 
because the judge assessed them under the hearsay rule 
and Rule 104(a), but the photos could not be admitted 
because they are physical evidence and only relevant if 
tied to the defendant under the Rule 104(b) standard? 
This would seem to make little or no sense, and the gut 
reaction of any experienced judge or lawyer is that it 
must be wrong. They are right. It is wrong.
Why is it Wrong?
It is wrong because the prosecution is not entitled to ask 
the jury to use evidence as being a genuine or authen-
tic anything without sufficient evidence for the jury to 
find by a preponderance of the evidence that it is what 
the government claims. In other words, the prosecu-
tion cannot ask the jury to infer or conclude something 
without an adequate evidentiary basis.
If the trial judge were to admit the statements based 
on the officer’s hearsay testimony at a hearing, the 
prosecution would have succeeded in offering no 
admissible evidence to justify asking the jury to find 
that the statements were made by the defendant. The 
statements would be in evidence, would prove nothing, 
and might in the end have to be stricken as irrelevant 
or as confusing under Rule 403.
What is right?
The bottom line is that any party wanting the jury to find 
that something is what that party claims it is must sat-
isfy Rule 104(b). To say, for example, that a website is 
the defendant’s, there must be sufficient evidence for the 
jury to find not just that there is a website with material 
on it, but also that the defendant operated that web-
site. The proponent of the evidence must offer sufficient 
foundational facts for the jury to find by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the website is the defendant’s. 
Under Rule 104(b), the judge is not a fact finder—the 
judge is a fact screener who decides whether there is suf-
ficient evidence for the jury to make the required finding.
If, however, evidence is properly authenticated but 
is also hearsay (such as the statements on the hypo-
thetical website), the judge must use the Bourjaily 
standard discussed in Harvey and, in order to satisfy 
Rule 801(d)(2)(A), make the requisite finding by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the defendant made 
the statements. In making this ruling, the judge is a 
fact finder.
conclusion
The simple hypothetical demonstrates that the propo-
nent of any evidence always must satisfy Rule 104(b) 
in order to be permitted to ask a jury to conclude that 
evidence is what the proponent claims it is. When 
the evidence is hearsay, the proponent must also sat-
isfy the hearsay rule and offer evidence (that need not 
itself be admissible) that enables the judge to find by a 
preponderance of the evidence that there is an exemp-
tion or exception that supports admission. The fact 
that evidence is hearsay does not remove the need for 
authentication; it means that in addition to authenticat-
ing the evidence and thereby satisfying Rule 104(b), 
the proponent must also satisfy the hearsay rule and 
satisfy Rule 104(a). n
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